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Stay the Hand of Justice? 
Evaluating Claims that War Crimes Trials 
Do More Harm than Good
Mark S. Martins & Jacob Bronsther
Abstract: An enduring dilemma in war is whether and how to punish those responsible for war crimes. In 
this essay, we analyze the most frequent criticisms made by war crimes trial skeptics, including the claims 
that such trials endanger prospects for peace by encouraging enemies to continue fighting, that they achieve 
only “victors’ justice” rather than real justice, and that, in any event, they are unnecessary due to the exis-
tence of more effective and less costly alternatives. We conclude, in accordance with a “moderate retrib-
utivism,” that when carried out consistently with established law and procedure, and when not dramati-
cally outweighed by concerns that trials will exacerbate ongoing or future conflicts, prosecutions are a le-
gitimate, and sometimes necessary, response to violations of the laws of war and international criminal 
law more broadly.
At St. James’s Palace in London during January 
of 1942, representatives of the governments whose 
countries had been occupied or were under assault 
from Germany met to consider fundamental ques-
tions that world war and Hitler’s still waxing aggres-
sion had pressed upon them. To the threshold jus ad 
bellum inquiry of whether fighting the war was justi-
fied, they responded without equivocation. The Na-
zis’ advancing columns on three continents and re-
gime of terror against diverse civilian populations 
left them no choice but to take up arms. To the jus in 
bello question of whether their own modes of fight-
ing should be constrained by morality and law, the 
response at St. James’s Palace was, again, unequivo-
cal. Although the desperate struggles to come would 
severely test the Allies’ unilateral commitment to re-
straints on warfare, the representative from occu-
pied Belgium expressed the common sentiment that 
“no matter how severe the necessities of war may be, 
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civilized nations have, nevertheless, rec-
ognized and proclaimed rules which ev-
ery belligerent ought to obey.”1 
Perhaps more remarkable at this dire 
point in the conflict was how the Allies an-
swered the emergent jus post bellum ques-
tion of what should be done with those 
responsible for the aggression, imprison-
ments, mass expulsions, hostage execu-
tions, and massacres that had brought so 
many disparate peoples under attack to-
gether in solidarity. It was the signature 
contribution of the Declaration of St. 
James’s Palace that “in order to avoid the 
repression of these acts of violence sim-
ply by acts of vengeance on the part of the 
general public,” the assembled nations 
“would place among their principal war 
aims the punishment, through the chan-
nel of organised justice, of those guilty of 
or responsible for these crimes, wheth-
er they have ordered them, perpetrated 
them or participated in them.”2 The war 
we have waged reluctantly but necessarily 
is a just war, they declared, and despite the 
depravity of our enemies, we will aspire to 
fight it humanely. Moreover, once we have 
prevailed, we will punish war criminals 
through the channel of organized justice. While 
there would yet be formidable opponents 
of such an approach–among them British 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who 
preferred summary execution of the war’s 
masterminds upon capture,3 and United 
States Supreme Court Chief Justice Harlan 
Fiske Stone, who derided postwar prosecu-
tion as a “lynching party”4–the unequiv-
ocal and unified early commitment at St. 
James’s Palace to holding war crimes tri-
als furnished enough momentum to carry 
the day over doubters of the concept once 
the conflict had formally ended. 
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, 
chief prosecutor for the United States in 
the trial of major war criminals before the 
International Military Tribunal at Nurem-
berg, would come to echo the Declaration 
of St. James’s Palace in his opening state-
ment: “That four great nations, flushed 
with victory and stung with injury, stay 
the hand of vengeance and voluntarily 
submit their captive enemies to the judg-
ment of the law is one of the most signif-
icant tributes that Power has ever paid to 
Reason.”5 Whether that trial, and the many 
thousands of others held following World 
War II, truly held vengeance at bay and paid 
tribute to reason is surely one of the essen-
tial tests of their worth. But there is no dis-
pute that trials of alleged war criminals 
were widely supported in the immediate 
aftermath of the war, even if they had their 
prominent detractors. Stay the hand of 
vengeance? Emphatically yes. But not the 
hand of justice. And failing to hold trials of 
those responsible for war crimes would of-
fend justice, this response insisted.
Such momentum for war crimes trials is 
rare. Consider the international response 
half a century later to atrocities occur-
ring on some of the same European lands 
once again engulfed in armed conflict. In 
May 1992, Bosnian Serb President Radovan 
Karadžić presided over the execution of 
thousands of civilians near the town of 
Brčko in Bosnia-Herzegovina,6 only fif-
ty miles from Sabac in Western Serbia, 
where in October 1941, German Field Mar-
shal Wilhelm List ordered the execution of 
thousands of concentration camp prison-
ers.7 Brčko and Sabac are fifty miles apart 
in the former Yugoslavia, sordidly linked 
by the programs of organized mass murder 
each hosted, fifty years apart. Yet interna-
tional alarm over the late twentieth-century 
Brčko massacre and related war crimes only 
slowly developed into resolve to hold of-
fenders accountable.
When concerted action finally came, war 
crimes trials were seen by many as doing 
more harm than good. In August of 1995, 
United States diplomat Richard Holbrooke 
confronted harsh questioning over wheth-
er the indictment of Karadžić and other se-
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nior figures by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia would 
harm prospects for peace. “Do you think 
it’s helpful to call [Karadžić] a war crim-
inal?” Holbrooke recalled one aggressive 
journalist baiting him. “Do you think it’s 
helpful in the negotiations?” Recalling 
“the days of [Nazi extermination camp 
overseer Heinrich] Himmler,” Holbrooke 
responded that “a crime against humanity 
of the sort that we have rarely seen in Eu-
rope” was “simply a fact and it has to be 
dealt with. I’m not going to cut a deal that 
absolves the people responsible for this.”8 
Even if his private views may have been 
more pragmatic, Holbrooke’s public re-
sponse–both uncompromising and righ-
teous–has much to commend it. But with-
out more, the simple and intuitive moral 
position that we should implement war 
crimes trials often fails to convince the dis-
tracted policy-makers responsible for facil-
itating such processes, particularly when 
sophisticated rationales are cited for fore-
going the trouble. This essay aims to clarify 
this dilemma by identifying and respond-
ing to some of the most frequent criticisms 
made by skeptics of war crimes trials, de-
fined here as trials for violations of the law 
of war or international criminal law more 
broadly, whether in courts of domestic, 
international, or hybrid administration. 
Analysis of these criticisms will suggest 
a framework for weighing, in a given in-
stance, the challenge to legitimacy that all 
war crimes courts undergo. While none of 
the criticisms represents a definitive trump 
against the general category of war crimes 
trials, each gives us pause. Through evalu-
ation of their merits, accordingly, we are 
better poised to determine, on a case-by-
case basis, whether the intuitive view fa-
voring trial and punishment of war crimi-
nals, shared by those at St. James’s Palace, 
ought to be implemented in the contem-
porary world. In the final section, we de-
velop a “moderate retributivism” to help 
guide this balancing analysis, concluding 
that when they are carried out in accor-
dance with established law and procedure, 
and when not dramatically outweighed by 
concerns that trials will exacerbate ongo-
ing or future conflicts, war crimes prosecu-
tions are a legitimate response to atrocities.
Implied in the skepticism that Holbrooke 
encountered is the claim that war crimes 
trials encourage leaders to continue fight-
ing. If losing a war means you will be pros-
ecuted–goes the argument–then you will 
be less likely to accept defeat. Put different-
ly, the first criticism we will consider is the 
view that war crimes trials create perverse 
incentives for leaders to commit further war 
crimes, or at least prolong conflict, so as 
to ward off defeat and avoid prosecution. 
This claim is difficult to evaluate, and 
what little empirical study there has been 
proves neither that fear of punishment re-
duces criminal behavior nor that war crim-
inals are fearless of prosecution. The claim 
involves an unknowable counterfactual: 
how would things be different if there 
were no threat of trial? We are not, how-
ever, entirely in the dark. While based on a 
plausible psychological premise–that cor-
nered humans fight more desperately–the 
claim causes less concern when considered 
in the context of war criminals’ actual in-
centive structures. As law professors Julian 
Ku and Jide Nzelibe explain, the effect of 
a new formal sanction (such as the threat 
of war crimes prosecution) depends upon 
the set of preexisting formal and informal 
sanctions (like the possibility of death by 
a vigilante mob).9 The severity of preex-
isting sanctions could well overwhelm 
the new formal one, which will thus only 
marginally impact decision-making. It is 
not enough, in other words, to know that 
war crimes trials might incentivize further 
fighting. We need to know how strong that 
incentive is, exactly, and how it compares 
to preexisting incentives. 




For various reasons, war crimes prose-
cutions in recent decades have generally 
been directed against individuals engaged 
in civil conflicts in weak or failing states 
and perceived to be committing atroci-
ties with impunity.10 To examine the pre-
existing sanctions faced by war criminals, 
Ku and Nzelibe look at the consequences 
faced by leaders of African coups and coup 
plots in such states from 1955 to 2003. Of 
the 279 leaders of failed coups, 35 percent 
were executed, murdered, or died in pris-
on, 22 percent were imprisoned, 16 per-
cent were arrested without any clear out-
comes, and 5 percent were exiled or tried 
in absentia.11 There were no such conse-
quences, meanwhile, for successful coup 
leaders. The point is that the preexisting 
incentives for war criminals to continue 
fighting and to win are profound. In addi-
tion to avoiding grave personal outcomes, 
they also include the possibility of achiev-
ing the often-desperate political objectives 
the war criminals set out to attain. It is not 
as if the threat of prosecution is the only 
consequence to losing a war. That such a 
threat provides an additional incentive to 
continue fighting tells us little about its 
ultimate significance to a leader’s unique 
cost-benefit analysis.
The incentives claim, furthermore, de-
pends upon the premise that military vic-
tory means immunity from prosecution, as 
a matter of law and/or politics. This prem-
ise, though, is not ironclad. The Prosecutor 
of the International Criminal Court (icc), 
for instance, has targeted sitting leaders, 
indicting Omar al-Bashir, president of Su-
dan, for alleged war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide in Darfur. While 
al-Bashir has evaded arrest thus far, the 
case–along with the (failed) prosecu-
tion of Uhuru Kenyatta, the current Ken-
yan president, for alleged crimes against 
humanity perpetrated during postelec-
tion violence in 2007–2008–creates at 
least some uncertainty about the victory- 
means-immunity premise. Consider as 
well that, while still influential in Chile as 
“senator for life,” Augusto Pinochet was 
arrested in London in 1998 to enforce an 
indictment for human rights violations is-
sued by a Spanish court in accordance with 
the principle of universal jurisdiction.
Another uncertain premise to the claim 
that war crimes trials incentivize further 
fighting is that perpetrators, when threat-
ened with prosecution, actually have the 
power to continue the conflict. We might 
say that the more fragile the peace, or the 
greater the possibility of a fragile peace, 
the more salient the worry about incen-
tives. Most notably, leaders of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army have in recent years in-
sisted that the 2005 International Crimi-
nal Court warrants for their arrest be lifted 
before signing a peace deal with Uganda, 
with the understanding that they retained 
the capacity to continue fighting. In many 
conflicts, however, peace is not so fragile. 
The conflict may be completely over, as it 
was when the Nuremberg trials were held, 
and as it is today during the trials of Khmer 
Rouge leaders in the hybrid national-inter-
national Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia. Or the conflict might 
be ongoing, but with a likely outcome that 
is not fragile, such that there is no actual 
concern that war crimes trials might exac-
erbate the conflict unnaturally. This could 
be the case in the war with Al Qaeda and 
associated groups.
More fundamentally, the incentives 
claim is vulnerable to an internal critique. 
The claim is based on the counterintuitive 
incentives created by the threat of pros-
ecution; that is, to continue fighting and 
to commit further war crimes, assuming a 
war crime has already been committed. Giv-
en its deeper assumption about the power-
ful incentive to avoid prosecution, howev-
er, the claim’s own logic also implies that 
war crimes trials tend to effectively deter 
leaders from committing war crimes in the 
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first place. As this tendency is itself one of 
the major justifications for such trials, the 
claim is, to some extent at least, inherent-
ly self-defeating. Though incentives either 
way are difficult to prove, surely any con-
cern about war crimes trials creating per-
verse incentives to keep fighting must be at 
least weighed against the concern that not 
putting war criminals on trial would sig-
nal to future offenders that they can com-
mit atrocities with impunity.
That war crimes trials achieve only “vic-
tors’ justice” rather than real justice is, of 
course, very nearly the same claim made by 
Chief Justice Stone when he denigrated the 
Nuremberg Trial of Major War Criminals 
as “Jackson’s high-grade lynching party.”12 
To assess this claim we need to determine 
whether war crimes trials meet the two ba-
sic requirements of a legitimate prosecu-
tion. The first such requirement is that the 
criminal law applied be legitimate. Follow-
ing legal philosopher Lon Fuller’s concep-
tion of legality, we might ask, at a mini-
mum, whether the law is part of a set of 
rules–rather than ad hoc commands–that 
are clear, public, prospective, consistent, 
stable, and that do not make impossible de-
mands.13 The second basic requirement is 
that the process be adequate: that the law 
be administered to defendants reasonably 
and fairly. 
While any prosecution could do better by 
either metric–for example, the law applied 
could always be clearer, and jurors could al-
ways be more impartial–the more ably a tri-
al meets these twin demands, the safer the 
conclusion that a defendant has been held 
to account legitimately through law, rath-
er than through brute force. That said, it is 
not all a matter of degree, and if a trial fails 
to meet either requirement conspicuously, 
we can deem any resulting punishment as 
manifestly outside the bounds of law.
How do war crimes trials fare on these 
two metrics? Do they apply well-made, le-
gitimate law, in accordance with Fuller’s 
theory? And do they administer that law 
fairly, providing adequate process to de-
fendants? We will examine two common 
criticisms regarding the former before re-
turning to the latter.
One criticism is that the law applied by 
war crimes trials is too unsettled and thus 
fails to measure up to Fuller’s ideal. For 
example, war crimes prosecutions from 
Nuremberg to the present day have been 
roiled by the dispute over whether joining 
a conspiracy to commit war crimes is itself 
an offense distinct from any other com-
pleted criminal act. The absence of a set-
tled answer makes a prosecution for mere 
conspiracy illegitimate, argue the critics, 
because without a stable definition of the 
crime, those with the greatest power can 
simply choose to punish what they want. 
At the Nuremberg trials, this criticism 
played out dramatically, as judges reject-
ed charges brought under what they saw to 
be a new offense, created post-conflict, of 
conspiracy to commit war crimes. Accord-
ing to the French judge on the Internation-
al Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1945, 
“the danger of such incriminations is that 
the door is opened to arbitrariness. The ac-
cusation of conspiracy is indeed a weapon 
preferred by tyrants. When Hitler want-
ed to strike at his political opponents, he 
accused them of having conspired against 
him.”14 Moreover, because the common 
law tradition in Britain and the United 
States of criminalizing conspiracy lacked a 
clear parallel in either Romano-Germanic 
or international law, to convict defeated 
German captives for merely having entered 
into an agreement–without needing to es-
tablish their individual responsibility for 
some actual completed murder or other 
offense carried out by the criminal enter-
prise–would defy the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege. This Latin maxim, literal-
ly translated as “no crime without law,” is 




the universal attribute of justice also ex-
pressed in the prohibition on ex post fac-
to laws in the United States Constitution.
Whether conspiracy to commit war 
crimes is a violation of the law of war was 
still a matter of dispute in 2006. That year, 
the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered the charge of conspiracy against Salim 
Hamdan, accused before a military com-
mission for having agreed to join Al Qae-
da and provide security and other services 
to Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan. Al-
though he was serving Bin Laden during 
a period of deadly Al Qaeda attacks in the 
Arabian Peninsula and the United States, 
no specific foreknowledge or advance con- 
tribution to those attacks was alleged 
against Hamdan himself.
Ruling on other grounds that the military 
commission lacked the authority to pro-
ceed, the Supreme Court divided on wheth-
er conspiracy as charged against Hamdan 
was a crime under the law of war, with no 
position supported by a majority of the jus-
tices.15 Hamdan’s later trial by a second mil-
itary commission resulted in his acquittal 
of not only conspiracy, but also the distinct 
but related charge of “providing material 
support for terrorism.” A reviewing federal 
appeals court would eventually declare this 
an unconstitutional ex post facto charge.16
While the modern echoes of Nurem-
berg’s conspiracy dispute are cautionary, 
the “unsettled” criticism itself merits 
skeptical evaluation. Judges at Nuremberg, 
for instance, ultimately based joint liabil-
ity upon war crimes with settled prewar 
existences. The legal adviser to Attorney 
General Francis Biddle, appointed by Pres-
ident Truman to sit in judgment at Nurem-
berg, explained that whereas Anglo-Amer-
ican conspiracy is “not embraced within 
the ordinary concept of crimes punish-
able as violations of the laws of war,” an-
other available theory of prosecution was 
well settled: “The theory of multiple lia-
bility for criminal acts executed pursuant 
to a common plan presents no compara-
ble problem, being common to all devel-
oped penal systems and easily included 
within the scope of the laws of war.”17 
In 124 prosecutions involving major war 
criminals and lesser German defendants, 
judges at Nuremberg recognized the con-
cept of group criminality, but they opted 
to convict only when the defendant in the 
dock individually participated in a com-
mon plan proven to have resulted in actu-
al atrocities.18
This approach is in full use today. The 
doctrines now applied by internation-
al criminal courts, “joint criminal enter-
prise” and “co-perpetration,” while differ-
ent in important ways, both rely on this 
theory of liability stemming from partic-
ipation in a common plan. The most re-
cent U.S. court to consider the question 
has also recognized the settled character of 
conspiracy as a theory of liability for com-
pleted crimes under the law of war.19 In the 
seventy years since World War II, then, not 
a long period of time from the perspective 
of law, courts have clarified what was be-
fore ambiguous, narrowing the debate dra-
matically, and thereby constraining and 
guiding conspiracy prosecutions.  
Legislatures, too, can ameliorate the crit-
icism by codifying offenses, thus enabling 
prosecutors to bring charges confidently 
as the law becomes more firmly settled, 
so long as legislative enactment postdates 
the alleged criminal conduct. And should 
courts feel that a particular conviction was 
based upon an ex post facto law, they can 
vacate the conviction, as happened with 
Hamdan, even as they provide guidance 
in opinions to bring further stability and 
consistency to the rules. Beyond conspir-
acy, this narrative applies as well to crimes 
against “peace” and “humanity,” offens-
es with undoubtedly controversial pre-
war legal statuses that were also charged 
at Nuremberg. For a defendant today could 
not reasonably claim that these offenses 
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represented legal novelties, given their in-
corporation post-Nuremberg into various 
domestic statutes and international trea-
ties, and also into customary internation-
al law. In sum, if aspects of the law of war 
are unsettled, the judicial, legislative, and 
prosecutorial institutions responsible for 
the law’s maintenance can act–and are 
acting–to resolve the situation. 
Another criticism about the law applied 
in war tribunals is that it traditionally has 
been military law, elements of which are 
inherently unbounded and thus pose a 
threat to civilian-led liberal democracies. 
Military law, at first blush, fails as a basis 
for legitimate criminal prosecutions in 
at least two ways. First, it has historical-
ly grown out of the need of military au-
thority to impose some semblance of order 
upon an inherently unruly battlefield, and 
such subordination to a single command-
er’s direction seems the antithesis of the 
impersonal, stable, and transparent struc-
ture of rules that Fuller envisions.  
Because the military, by necessity, em-
phasizes “security and order of the group 
[over] value and integrity of the individ-
ual,” Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black 
maintained that military law thereby also 
“emphasizes the iron hand of discipline 
more than it does the even scales of jus-
tice.”20 Furthermore, Black argued, mil-
itary tribunals are typically ad hoc bod-
ies appointed by a military officer from 
among his subordinates. They have always 
been subject to varying degrees of “com-
mand influence.”21
Such influence, critics in this vein insist, 
precludes military law from ever truly be-
ing law, as it fails to provide an indepen-
dent and comprehensive constraint upon 
its administrators. A prosecution for al-
leged war crimes on the basis of military 
law is thus merely an extension of the com-
mander’s will. It is the “rule of man,” rath-
er than the rule of law.
Second, military law’s unbounded na-
ture stems not only from the tradition of 
command influence and control, say the 
critics, but also from the limitless charac-
ter of war itself. Prussian general and mil-
itary theorist Carl von Clausewitz defined 
war as “an act of force to compel our en-
emy to do our will” and reflected that “to 
introduce the principle of moderation into 
the theory of war itself would always lead 
to logical absurdity.”22 Rather, “there is no 
logical limit” to the application of force, 
for in war “a reciprocal action is started” 
between the opponents “which must lead, 
in theory, to extremes.”23
The brutality of real-world hostilities 
has validated Clausewitz’s theory again 
and again. Some have noted that war’s 
tendency toward extremes–and the calls 
for military authority such conditions 
can bring–poses a dire threat to civil lib-
erties. English jurist William Blackstone 
warned in 1769 that martial law was “in 
truth and reality no law, but something to 
be indulged rather than allowed as a law,” 
concluding that “therefore it ought not to 
be permitted in time of peace.”24 And Jus-
tice Jackson, before serving as chief prose-
cutor at Nuremberg, wrote that “the very 
essence of the military job is to marshal 
physical force, to remove every obstacle 
to its effectiveness,” and that such mea-
sures “will not, and often should not, be 
held within the limits that bind civil au-
thority in peace.”25 A commander’s orders 
in war, Jackson cautioned, thus “may have 
a certain authority as military commands, 
although they may be very bad as . . . law.”26
The law applied in war crimes trials, how-
ever, has developed so as to incorporate 
constraints upon these otherwise unbound-
ed influences. Tribunals created out of com-
manders’ inherent authority have been re-
placed by war crimes forums established 
pursuant to international treaties and do-
mestic statutes, thus surmounting military 
law with law made by the peoples’ civilian 




representatives. The threshold of necessity 
for resorting to such forums, at least for the 
prosecution of true war crimes, as opposed 
to crimes against humanity and genocide, 
is that the crimes will have been committed 
during genuine hostilities, a context char-
acterized by more than mere sporadic at-
tacks and consisting of protracted armed 
violence of a nature, scope, and intensity 
that a state is compelled to employ its mil-
itary forces in order to protect its people.27
Substantial protections against unbri-
dled military authority are now expressly 
contained in law. Under the Geneva Con-
ventions, punishment may be meted out 
for war crimes only if there has been a trial 
by “a regularly constituted court affording 
all of the judicial guarantees recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples.”28 In 
addition to the safeguards against ex post 
facto laws and group criminal liability al-
ready mentioned, these guarantees include 
the presumption of innocence, the right to 
be tried in one’s presence, the right to no-
tice of particular charges, and the prohibi-
tion against compelling an accused to tes-
tify against himself.29 Furthermore, under 
the Military Commissions Act of 2009, de-
fendants in the U.S. military commissions 
have the right to appeal any final judgment 
in federal civilian court.30
Conceding truth in prior ages to the ax-
iom inter arma silent legis (“in times of war, 
the law falls silent”), the late Chief Justice 
William H. Rehnquist found reason to 
doubt the axiom’s veracity today: “There 
is every reason to think that the historic 
trend against the least justified of the cur-
tailments of civil liberty in wartime will 
continue in the future. . . . The laws will thus 
not be silent in time of war, but they will 
speak with a somewhat different voice.”31 
Without disdaining the recurrent crit-
icisms of war crimes trials grounded in 
their martial tradition–for vigilance re-
garding “military necessity” remains ever- 
prudent, especially in contexts where the 
application of domestic and internation-
al law is absent or insincere–it is wise to 
remember Rehnquist’s longer perspective 
when evaluating such criticisms.
One might accept the legitimacy of the 
substantive law applied in war crimes tri-
als but nonetheless reject the adequacy of 
the process provided to defendants in par-
ticular prosecutions. Consider the 2015 tri-
al in Libya of Saif al-Islam Gadaffi, the son 
of deposed leader Muammar Gadaffi, and 
eight other members of the former regime 
for war crimes linked to the 2011 revolution. 
The procedural failings, according to the 
United Nations, included witness intimi-
dation, lack of access to lawyers, and fail-
ure to present witnesses and documents in 
open court. At its most skeptical, though, 
this procedural criticism applies to trials 
less overtly unfair. It acknowledges the var-
ious fairness guarantees contained in law 
and even concedes that certain procedur-
al protections may be both legally required 
and formally complied with, while never-
theless maintaining that the resulting tri-
als fail to achieve impartial justice because 
of flaws or corruption in how the law is ad-
ministered.
Before his captors could impose the death 
penalty announced for him in 1946, Nazi 
leader and Gestapo founder Herman Go-
ering committed suicide by ingesting cya-
nide. Prior to taking his own life, Goering 
had repeatedly objected that his Nurem-
berg trial was nothing more than siegerjustiz 
(“victors’ justice”). The objection was not 
that he was deprived of legal process, for 
he had prominently received an attorney 
and an elaborate public hearing; rather, he 
claimed that the trial was a show intend-
ed to disseminate the victors’ propaganda 
while disguising his foreordained execu-
tion, a sentence compelled merely by his 
being a defeated German leader.32
We hear echoes of Goering’s objection 
in claims made today that detainees of the 
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United States in its war against Al Qaeda 
cannot receive truly fair trials because they 
are mostly Arabs, Muslims, or both, and 
in any event have been predetermined 
to be enemies. Moreover, just as Nurem-
berg critics scoffed at the prospect of war 
crimes prosecutions by the Soviets, whose 
own unpunished transgressions included 
the mass execution of Polish nationals 
during 1940 in the Katyn Forest, critics of 
military commission trials at Guantana-
mo complain that they punish the “ene-
my” while conveniently overlooking al-
legations of torture and evidence of mis-
treatment by persons acting on behalf of 
the United States. 
While such criticisms are fundamental, 
there is little to be gained in evaluating the 
extreme claim that no victor is capable of 
administering a war crimes trial fairly. To 
insist that, as an analytical truth, any such 
process is dominated by prejudice or par-
tiality is to leave no room for further ap-
praisal. A more tempered skepticism is 
warranted, one capable of distinguishing 
between separate prosecutive efforts.
William Shawcross, the son of Britain’s 
chief prosecutor at Nuremberg and author 
of a book inspired by his father’s work, 
points to the zealous advocacy of Goer-
ing’s attorney, to the prosecution’s burden 
of proof, and to the acquittals of three out 
of twenty-three codefendants in arguing 
that the Nazi leader’s trial was conducted 
fairly. Shawcross further argues that defen-
dants at Nuremberg were accorded fewer 
rights, privileges, and entitlements than 
an accused receives before a United States 
military commission today, particularly in 
light of Congress strengthening the pro-
cess therein with the Military Commis-
sions Acts of 2006 and 2009. Whereas at 
Nuremberg, defendants “could be tried in 
absentia, had no right against self-incrim-
ination, and had no right to challenge the 
judges,” each of these protections is pres-
ent at Guantanamo.33 The procedural pro-
tections at the International Criminal Tri-
bunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for 
Rwanda and the icc are similarly robust 
by comparison with Nuremberg.
But as important as the legal rights that 
are formally required by statute, Shaw-
cross and others note, is the legitimacy that 
comes from their dynamic and determined 
application. Modern trials have benefited 
from well-qualified and fully resourced de-
fense teams and from extensive govern-
ment pretrial disclosures of the evidence 
in the case. These practices have enabled 
the accused and their counsel to prepare to 
confront the charges. Moreover, the delays 
in reaching trial, both at the U.S. military 
commissions and at the international tri-
bunals, with each prosecutorial move met 
with vigorous and not infrequently effec-
tive defense tactics, undercut any notion 
that the captors are rushing to judgment 
over their vanquished enemies, however 
frustrating such delays are to family mem-
bers of the victims.
While no practice can assure legitima-
cy, some skeptics may be mollified by the 
openness of the proceedings. The U.S. 
military commissions, for instance, are 
watched by an international corps of news 
reporters as well as by members of the pub-
lic in Guantanamo and at closed-circuit 
television sites in the continental United 
States. And still other modern-day checks 
and balances assist in holding the U.S. gov-
ernment itself accountable to law, even as 
it prosecutes alleged Al Qaeda members. 
These include congressional oversight 
committees, executive branch inspectors 
general and judge advocates, and power-
ful human rights organizations.34 
Measures promoting transparency and 
government accountability may or may 
not be sufficient to surmount the “victors’ 
justice” criticism in a given trial, particu-
larly one involving a defendant claiming 
national or sectarian bias by those judging 
him. Writing of domestic criminal trials, 




the Supreme Court has discerned that “the 
people of an open society do not demand 
infallibility of their institutions, but it is 
difficult for them to accept what they are 
prohibited from observing.”35 With war 
crimes prosecutions facing even great-
er barriers to acceptance among foreign 
and international audiences, transparent 
and accountable processes are surely nec-
essary for widespread confidence in trials 
to be achieved, even if such processes are 
not sufficient in themselves to satisfy all ob-
servers that real justice is being done. 
Risks that war crimes trials will do harm 
seem less acceptable the less necessary 
they are to achieve some worthy end. It 
is thus a critical claim against such trials 
that “restorative justice” mechanisms, ci-
vilian prosecutions, or other alternatives 
have rendered them unnecessary by pro-
viding better methods of healing society’s 
wounds, holding offenders accountable, 
and preventing future offenses. 
Concerns that prosecuting the likes of Ra-
dovan Karadžić might spoil efforts to end 
a war are compounded if, as legal scholar 
Kent Greenawalt has written, the “time, ex-
pense, and procedural safeguards” of war 
crimes trials also result in relatively few of-
fenders actually being identified.36 Propo-
nents of truth and reconciliation commis-
sions claim that they are an attractive alter-
native to traditional prosecutions because, 
as Greenawalt continues, “each [instance 
of] testimony by a victim and each identi-
fication of an offender achieves some por-
tion of the justice of a criminal trial and con-
viction.”37 In the aggregate, these small por-
tions of justice collectively outweigh that 
achieved by a few war crimes prosecu-
tions, enabling the parties to a conflict to 
acknowledge what happened, become rec-
onciled to it and to each other, and move 
forward within a restored peace. Further-
more, such critics often argue, war crimes 
trials tend to mischaracterize the collective, 
possibly even bureaucratic nature of mass 
atrocities by placing blame solely upon par-
ticular individuals, and thereby absolving 
the wider community or organization. 
The claim by proponents of exclusively 
civilian prosecutions of offenders, mean-
while, is that war crimes trials are unnec-
essary because well-established domes-
tic charges and judicial forums can con-
vict and punish with little of the cost, legal 
uncertainty, and delay attendant to press-
ing law of war charges before ad hoc tri-
bunals. To advocate ending military com-
missions, one group cites the hundreds of 
civilian prosecutions for terrorism offens-
es in U.S. federal courts since the 9/11 at-
tacks.38 Another argues that civilian pros-
ecutions are both fairer and more effective 
at holding offenders accountable.39 We 
thus need not offer amnesty to offenders–
the perceived cost of truth and reconcilia-
tion commissions–in order to heal society 
and restore the peace. And we can do with-
out war crimes trials altogether. 
Still other alternatives to war crimes tri-
als emphasize the supposedly superior in-
capacitation that comes from targeting or 
simply detaining threats, rather than pros-
ecuting them. Whereas conducting a trial 
provides a platform for the spewing of odi-
ous beliefs by accused persons or their at-
torneys and risks acquittal and even sub-
sequent release, say the proponents of 
this approach, the attacking of one’s en-
emies in war is a long-standing and justi-
fied alternative. Law of war detention, too, 
serves the purpose of taking detainees off 
the battlefield while also making detainees 
available to be interviewed, thus furnish-
ing intelligence that can guide further op-
erations to disrupt attacks and dismantle 
enemy networks. So long as the targeting 
and detention are lawful, say the advocates 
for targeting and detention, why bother 
with war crimes trials? 
Each of these proposed alternatives is a 
strange ally of the others. Each also merits 
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critical evaluation as to whether it actual-
ly provides a full alternative, rendering war 
crimes trials unnecessary. Truth commis-
sions and related processes that stress rec-
onciliation over accountability have helped 
certain societies, in particular South Afri-
ca, move beyond civil conflicts. As a gener-
al matter, though, they are subject to doubts 
about whether they can achieve their am-
bitious stated aims, including whether vic-
tims’ narratives and perpetrators’ confes-
sions will actually document and provide 
catharsis in the aftermath of widespread 
crime, and whether seeking to move for-
ward without punishment of offenders 
may actually undermine rather than bol-
ster public trust in government. Even with 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, given its limited mandate to 
examine “gross human rights violations,” 
the tactical and negotiated nature of much 
testimony, and the lack of funds available 
to pay reparations, its success at healing the 
wounds of apartheid was surely a matter of 
degree.40 The logic of such commissions, 
furthermore, applies more straightforward-
ly to civil conflicts, where parties must learn 
to live and govern together after the con-
flict’s end; their role as a response to war 
crimes in noncivil conflicts, by comparison, 
is less assured. As a moral matter, finally, re-
storative justice often will offend even the 
moderate retributivism described in the fol-
lowing section by failing to censure even the 
most egregious offenders. Restorative jus-
tice, in other words, is at best an incom-
plete solution when pursued independent 
of some component of punishment, and a 
system that lacks any possibility for retri-
bution is no true candidate for displacing 
war crimes trials altogether. To anticipate 
a reply, even with “collective” war crimes, 
retributive justice, with its focus on punish-
ing individual wrongdoing, would at a min-
imum license prosecuting commanders and 
senior officials who ordered subordinates 
to commit atrocities. More generally–and 
nonexclusively–it would also license pros-
ecuting individuals who freely volunteered 
into organizations or units dedicated to, or 
known for, war crimes.
Advocates for using only civilian prose-
cutions cite diverse rationales, but in de-
fending a deservedly proud tradition of 
law enforcement and nonmilitary crimi-
nal justice, they fail to make the case that 
war crimes trials are unneeded. In the ex-
perience of the United States, for example, 
federal civilian agents and prosecutors can 
and do disrupt and punish a wide variety 
of terrorist and other organized threats–
including through the charging of precur-
sor crimes such as identity fraud or immi-
gration violations–and the legitimacy of 
a federal court conviction is usually un-
questioned. But federal civilian courts’ 
exclusion of reliable and lawfully collect-
ed hearsay statements seems unwise when 
witnesses inhabit the same ungoverned re-
gions where war crimes were hatched and 
are thus unavailable for trial. The require-
ment that statements by an accused be pre-
ceded by warnings of the rights to remain 
silent and to have an attorney also makes 
little sense in a situation of genuine over-
seas hostilities. And of the twenty federal 
court prosecutions since 9/11 of Al Qae-
da members who were captured overseas 
and were also triable for war crimes–a 
more pertinent data point than the hun-
dreds of purely domestic prosecutions–
all but one came into our custody through 
law enforcement cooperation with foreign 
governments who declined to prosecute.41 
This is hardly a convincing record for ban-
ning trials that feature sensible and fair ev-
identiary rules suited to punishing mem-
bers of irregular hostile groups, who plan 
attacks from difficult-to-reach sanctuar-
ies in increasing numbers.
Furthermore, it matters why we punish 
offenders. War crimes trials can more ful-
ly express a war criminal’s wrongdoing by 
punishing him not only for, say, killing in-




nocent people, as a civilian court might, 
but also for committing the distinct le-
gal and moral wrong of killing innocent 
people as a means of war. In addition to 
wronging his immediate victims, he also 
acts to make war in general more brutal 
and horrible. A war crimes tribunal, es-
tablished for its distinct purpose, with a 
charge sheet specifying war crimes rather 
than civilian crimes, and with members of 
the military possibly taking part as judg-
es, prosecutors, and jurors, can assist in 
expressing this conviction, even as civil-
ian condemnation also finds an appropri-
ate voice.
Proponents of simply targeting and de-
taining such threats fare no better in ren-
dering war crimes trials unnecessary.42 Al-
though targeted and proportional attacks 
on enemies during hostilities are permit-
ted under the law of war, and although hu-
mane detention of combatants is also law-
ful for the duration of an armed conflict, 
these modes of incapacitating terrorist 
threats are only legitimate insofar as they 
can be established to be necessary. Military 
and intelligence operations in the sover-
eign territory of foreign states are unjus-
tified except in the narrow and urgent cir-
cumstance where a host nation is truly un-
willing or unable to eliminate the threat. 
And detention until the end of the war be-
comes, in reality, punishment without tri-
al when the war extends indefinitely for 
many years and even decades. 
Analysis of these and other skeptical 
claims suggests that the legitimacy of war 
crimes trials must be evaluated case by 
case. None of the claims is a clear trump. 
While each criticism gives us pause, their 
relevance will vary, as we have seen. But 
how do we assess their ultimate impact, 
and determine the legitimacy of a given 
tribunal, or the wisdom of instituting war 
crimes trials in a particular ad bellum, in bel-
lo, or post bellum context? 
Reflection upon the claims and criticisms 
highlighted in the foregoing pages sug-
gests that a purposive analysis may prove 
useful. That means inquiring into the pur-
poses of war crimes trials, and then assess-
ing whether a particular tribunal realizes 
them, or would realize them, sufficiently. 
Upon such inquiry, it becomes apparent 
that war crimes trials have both backward- 
and forward-looking purposes. They have 
the backward-looking aim of delivering 
retribution “through the channel of orga-
nized justice,” in addition to various for-
ward-looking aims such as deterring future 
war crimes–in a particular conflict or more 
generally–and promoting the rule of law. 
We can recast the claims and criticisms 
in these terms. The claims that war crimes 
trials apply arbitrary, unsettled, or un-
bounded law, that they deliver sham pro-
cess, that they punish individuals for com-
munal crimes, and that alternatives can 
deliver punishment more swiftly or reli-
ably are all claims that war crimes trials fail 
to realize their backward-looking purpose 
of holding offenders accountable for their 
past wrongdoing in accordance with law. 
Meanwhile, the claims that war crimes 
trials incentivize further fighting, imper-
il peace agreements, and prevent commu-
nal reconciliation are claims that they fail 
to realize their forward-looking purposes. 
The two types of aims can dovetail, as 
Robert Jackson expressed in his open-
ing statement at the Nuremberg trials. By 
“stay[ing] the hand of vengeance” and de-
livering “a just and measured retribution” 
to Nazi leaders through law, Jackson ar-
gued, the Tribunal could advance the for-
ward-looking aim of preventing future war 
crimes as it “put the forces of international 
law, its precepts, its prohibitions and, most 
of all, its sanctions, on the side of peace.”43 
Assessment of prosecutions that advance 
both aims simultaneously–as many now 
view the Nuremberg trials to have done–
will generally be positive.
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The two types of aims, however, are in-
commensurable, meaning that there is no 
deeper concern or value that can cash out 
conflicts between the two, and they will not 
always harmonize.44 Their relationship, in-
deed, is notoriously complex and conten-
tious. Some argue that the central aim of 
punishment is, and must be, forward-look-
ing deterrence, but that, for reasons of effi-
ciency and fairness, we should only punish 
the morally culpable.45 Others start in the 
other direction, arguing that an offender’s 
retributive guilt makes him liable for pun-
ishment, which should then be delivered if 
and only if justified by consequentialist con-
siderations.46 Some retributivists, though, 
take a much harder line in accordance with 
Kant, arguing that punishment–like, say, 
people’s right to equal treatment–is justi-
fied “because, and only because” it is de-
served, irrespective of any consequentialist 
benefits that may result.47 While lacking the 
space to fully engage with this debate, we 
posit a “moderate retributivism,” where-
by some positive value accrues in delivering 
proportionate censure and hard treatment 
to an offender, regardless of the conse-
quences.48 While this value will not always 
be sufficiently high, in and of itself, to jus-
tify punishment, the scale of wrongdoing 
involved with many international criminal 
violations is so profound that the retribu-
tive imperative to punish will be substantial 
even on this moderate view. But how sub-
stantial? How does it measure up to our for-
ward-looking concerns, which remain in-
dependently relevant on this theory, when 
they push hard in the other direction?49 In 
particular, what if prosecuting alleged war 
criminals would make peace less likely? 
When presented with this dilemma, 
Holbrooke–in the example of whether 
Karadžić should have been prosecuted–
can be said to have publicly taken a rigid, 
even Kantian line in support of retribu-
tive justice. Holbrooke’s view was that the 
atrocities in the Balkans were so extreme 
that worrying about whether prosecutions 
would jeopardize peace was inappropriate. 
Kant wrote famously in Philosophy of Law:
Even if a civil society resolved to dissolve it-
self with the consent of all its members–
as might be supposed in the case of a peo-
ple inhabiting an island resolving to sepa-
rate and scatter themselves throughout the 
whole world–the last murderer lying in the 
prison ought to be executed before the reso-
lution was carried out. This ought to be done 
in order that every one may realize the desert 
of his deeds, and that blood-guiltiness may 
not remain upon the people; for otherwise 
they might all be regarded as participators in 
the murder as a public violation of justice.50
Kant explains here that the justification 
of retributive justice does not depend upon 
its good, forward-looking consequences. 
In his hypothetical, since the island soci-
ety is disbanding, no good consequences 
will follow from the execution; in partic-
ular, it will deter no future murderer. And 
yet, on his view, as a matter of justice, the 
execution must still take place.
The “hypothetical” that Holbrooke con-
fronted exposes, no less starkly, the irrele-
vance of consequences to retributive jus-
tice. Indeed, the issue was not that pros-
ecuting Karadžić and others might fail to 
generate positive consequences, but rath-
er that such prosecution risked hugely neg-
ative consequences, namely, the continu-
ance of a nasty war. Holbrooke’s “hypo-
thetical” was this: should the community 
of nations prosecute a guilty murderer–in-
deed, a guilty mass murderer–if, by doing 
so, it risks dissolution of a fragile emerg-
ing peace settlement and the death of many 
of its members’ citizens? By answering in 
the affirmative, Holbrooke championed, in 
the strongest possible terms, a moral duty 
to hold individuals legally accountable for 
their wrongdoing.
The appraisal of war crimes trials with 
inherent forward-looking risks, howev-




er, cannot end so neatly for at least two 
reasons. First, keeping in mind for an in-
stant just the backward-looking criticisms, 
only a tribunal that applies well-made le-
gal rules with due process could ever car-
ry out a duty to prosecute, and these chal-
lenges alone are so formidable that result-
ing trials will evade neat assessments even 
without the possibility of dire future con-
sequences. Second, keeping in mind also 
the forward-looking criticisms, even if we 
assume what a moderate retributivism de-
nies–that delivering retributive justice is 
always a full-blown duty–we must under-
stand that duties can sometimes be over-
ridden, possibly by other duties–maybe 
the duty to maintain social order–and 
that the decision to set up institutions ca-
pable of prosecuting war crimes is ulti-
mately a matter of political judgment by 
leaders with the power to do so. 
While, in the moderate retributivist 
view, there ought to be a strong presump-
tion in favor of prosecution in the case 
of mass international crimes, there are 
thus no clean answers. As political scien-
tist Gary Bass has written, “It is import-
ant to remember that legal justice is one 
political good among many–like peace, 
stability, democracy, and distributive jus-
tice.”51 Bass here echoes Alexander Ham-
ilton, who writes in The Federalist Papers: 
No. 47, “In seasons of insurrection or re-
bellion, there are often critical moments, 
when a well-timed offer of pardon to the 
insurgents or rebels may restore the tran-
quillity of the commonwealth.”52 The 
pragmatism of this perspective dilutes 
Holbrooke’s certitude appropriately, yet 
in examining alternatives to prosecutions 
with forward-looking costs, it is crucial to 
critically evaluate the details of, and the 
costs inherent to, the alternatives them-
selves. We must seek to consider the pre-
ferred course of action described or im-
plied by each critic, making reasonable 
assumptions to fill often prevalent gaps. 
Precisely what kind of substitute response 
is envisioned? To whom are those champi-
oning such a response accountable? And 
does the cost-benefit analysis proposed 
or suggested really incorporate all rele-
vant costs and benefits that will be borne 
by the entire population?
For the question, ultimately, cannot be 
whether to stay the hand of justice. That 
hand carries scales, and the scales of jus-
tice must always be permitted to do their 
work, here by weighing the prosecution of 
mass murderers against the pursuit of oth-
er goods. The decision to prosecute is not 
always straightforward and is never with-
out price. But when carried out consistent-
ly with established law and procedure, and 
when not dramatically outweighed by for-
ward-looking concerns, war crimes pros-
ecutions are a legitimate, and sometimes 
necessary, response to egregious and wide-
spread violations of the laws of war. This 
is so because all nations rely upon enforce-
ment of these laws for their security, even 
as enforcement also confirms our individ-
ual and collective humanity.
endnotes
  Authors’ Note: We are indebted to Kelly Giltner, Chelsea Green, Jaspreet Saini, and Mos 
Thravalos for their research assistance. For thoughtful comments on earlier drafts, we would 
like to sincerely thank Devika Hovell, Nicola Lacey, Seth Lazar, Ryan Liss, Deborah Pearl-
stein, Scott Sagan, Gerry Simpson, Rebecca Sutton, and Ben Valentino. We are also grateful 
for the comments of participants at the seminar organized for this volume at Stanford Uni-
versity on June 30, 2015.
146 (1)  Winter 2017 97
Mark S. 
Martins  
& Jacob  
Bronsther
 1 Hubert Pierlot, “The Inter-Allied Conference, January 13, 1942,” Bulletin of International News 
19 (2) (January 1942): 52, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25643188. Hubert Pierlot, the prime 
minister of Belgium, made this statement upon signing the Declaration of St. James’s Palace, 
in London, January 13, 1942. 
 2 Inter-Allied Information Committee, Punishment for War Crimes: The Declaration and Related Documents 
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1942).
 3 Hartley Shawcross, Life Sentence: The Memoirs of Hartley Shawcross (London: Constable, 1995), 87. 
Shawcross reflects upon Churchill’s preference for summary justice. 
 4 Harlan Fiske Stone quoted in Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law (New 
York: The Viking Press, 1956), 716.
 5 Robert H. Jackson, Chief Prosecutor for the United States of America, “Opening Statement Before 
the International Military Tribunal (November 21, 1945),” in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before 
the International Military Tribunal, vol. 2 (Nuremberg: Secretariat of the Tribunal, 1947), 98–99.
 6 United Nations Security Council, Bosnia and Herzegovina (s/res/798), December 18, 1992, https://
documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/828/82/img/N9282882.pdf.
 7 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, vol. 11 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 757, 971–72, 1264–1274, http://www 
.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-XI.pdf.
 8 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Modern Library, 1999), 90.
 9 Julian Ku and Jide Nzelibe, “Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Hu-
manitarian Atrocities?” Washington University Law Review 84 (2006): 777–833.
 10 Ibid., 785–786.
 11 Ibid., 804.
 12 Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law, 716.
 13 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 33–38. 
 14 Donnedieu de Vabres quoted in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under 
Control Council Law No. 10, vol. 15 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), 
1077, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/NTs_war-criminals.html. 
 15 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 595–613 (2006). 
 16 Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 27–29 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 17 Memorandum from Herbert Wechsler, Assistant Attorney General, War Division, United States 
Department of Justice, to the Attorney General, December 29, 1944, located in the National 
Archives at College Park, Maryland. Wechsler comments on the “Bernays Plan” to try Nazi 
war criminals. 
 18 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, vol. 11. 
 19 Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 27–29 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
 20 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 38–41 (1957). 
 21 Ibid. 
 22 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), 76. 
 23 Ibid. 
 24 William Blackstone, “Of the Military and Maritime States,” in Commentaries on the Laws of England: 
The Rights of Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765), book I, chap. 13. 
 25 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 244 (1944) (Justice Jackson dissenting). 
 26 Ibid. 




 27 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. it-94-1-i, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (International Criminal Tribubal for the Former Yugoslavia, Octo-
ber 2, 1995); and United States v. Hamdan (Military Commission, 2008) (panel instruction). 
 28 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135, art. 3. 
 29 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Article 6, December 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
 30 10 U.S.C. § 950g.
 31 William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in Wartime (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1998), 224–225.
 32 Gustave M. Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary (Boston: Da Capo Press, 1995), 12–13, 32, 419.
 33 William Shawcross, Justice and the Enemy: Nuremberg, 9/11, and the Trial of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 
(New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 101.
 34 Jack Goldsmith, Power and Constraint (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2012).
 35 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980). 
 36 Kent Greenawalt, “Amnesty’s Justice,” in Truth v.  Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, ed. Rob-
ert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010), 202.
 37 Ibid., 197.
 38 “Facts and Figures: Military Commissions v. Federal Courts,” Human Rights Watch, http://
www.hrw.org/features/guantanamo-facts-figures (last modified December 23, 2011). 
 39 “Terrorism Cases Should Be Tried in Federal Court,” American Civil Liberties Union, https://
www.aclu.org/terrorism-cases-should-be-tried-federal-court. 
 40 See Elizabeth Stanley, “Evaluating the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” Journal of Modern 
African Studies 39 (2001): 525–546.
 41 The twenty cases are as follows: 1. The United States v. Mohammed Mansour Jabarah (S.D.N.Y. 2002); 
2. Nalfi (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 3. Afridi (S.D. Ca. 2004); 4. Zayed (E.D.N.Y. 2005); 5. Moayed (E.D.N.Y. 
2005); 6. Syed (S.D. Ca. 2006); 7. Kassir (S.D.N.Y. 2009); 8. Delaema (D.D.C. 2009); 9. Siddiqui 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); 10. Ghailani (S.D.N.Y. 2010); 11. Warsame (S.D.N.Y. 2011); 12. Issa (S.D.N.Y. 
2011); 13. Ghaith (S.D.N.Y. 2014); 14. Hamza (S.D.N.Y. 2014); 15. Babar (D.Conn. 2014); 16. Bary 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014); 17. Fawwaz (S.D.N.Y. 2014); 18. Naseer (E.D.N.Y. 2015); 19. Hamidullin (E.D. 
Va. 2015); 20. Saddiq (E.D.N.Y. 2015). The United States gained custody of four of these persons 
from the United Kingdom (14–18), two from Hong Kong (3, 6), two from Germany (5, 6), one 
from Canada (1), one from The Netherlands (8), one from the Czech Republic (7), one from 
Ghana (12), one from Kenya (2), one from Jordan (13), and one from Saudi Arabia (20). Only 
three came from portions of Southwest Asia containing large regions of ungoverned space (Af-
ghanistan: 9, 19; Pakistan: 10; and international waters near the Arabian Peninsula: 11); and 
these required close coordination with U.S. military forces and nonstandard law enforcement 
detention. A comparison of these prosecutions with the fifteen thus far tried or arraigned by 
military commission is instructive, though beyond the scope of this essay. The fifteen military 
commissions prosecutions: 1. The United States v. David Matthew Hicks (2007); 2. Hamdan (2008); 
3. Bahlul (2008); 4. Qosi (2010); 5. Khadr (2010); 6. Noor (2011); 7. Khan (2012); 8. Darbi (2014); 
9. Nashiri (ongoing); 10. K. S. Mohammed (ongoing); 11. Khallad (ongoing); 12. Ramzi (ongoing); 
13. Hawsawi (ongoing); 14. Ammar (ongoing); 15. Hadi (ongoing).
 42 Goldsmith, Power and Constraint, 144. 
 43 Trials of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, vol. 2, 99–101.
 44 See Nicola Lacey, State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values (London: Routledge, 
1988), 49, 55–56.
146 (1)  Winter 2017 99
Mark S. 
Martins  
& Jacob  
Bronsther
 45 See H. L. A. Hart, “Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment,” in Punishment and Responsibility 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968); and John Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” The Philosophical 
Review 64 (1955): 3–32.
 46 See, for example, Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
 47 Michael S. Moore, “The Moral Worth of Retribution,” in New Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. 
Ferdinand Shoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1987), 179.
 48 See Jeffrie G. Murphy, “Retributivism and the State’s Interest in Punishment,” in Criminal Justice: 
Nomos XXVII, ed. J. Roland Penncock and John W. Chapman (New York: New York University 
Press, 1985); Ramon M. Lemos, “A Defense of Retributivism,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 
15 (1977): 62–63; Michael Philips, “The Justification of Punishment and the Justification of Po-
litical Authority,” Law and Philosophy 5 (1986): 401–410; Larry Alexander, Kimberly Kessler Fer-
zan, and Stephen Morse, Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 7–10; and Alec Whalen, “Retributive Justice,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Center for the Study 
of Language and Information, 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/
justice-retributive/. 
 49 While maybe inelegant, it is not necessarily objectionable that a political practice has independent 
justificatory principles, which can conflict in certain circumstances. The principles underlying 
free speech, for instance–like the value of personal expression and the contribution free speech 
makes to a healthy democracy–will sometimes clash. Consider the cases of antidemocratic 
speech, such as hate speech or demagoguery. Where a practice has multiple justificatory principles, 
it is enough that each provides independent reasons in support of that practice, and that, as 
a general matter, they are not contradictory. 
 50 Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law, trans. William Hastie (Edinburgh: T. T. Clark, 1887), 198.
 51 Gary Bass, “Jus Post Bellum,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (2004): 405.
 52 Alexander Hamilton, “The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning 
Power of the Executive,” in James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, The Federalist 
Papers, ed. Isaac Kramnick (New York: Penguin, 1987), 423.
